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Abstract 
This paper discusses the necessity of a coordinated mechanism for controlling river basin emissions and water quality. 
The authors, based on the models by Hung et al, present new models by taking government as the most important role 
in the coordinated mechanism. The main conclusions from the discussions are: (1) dividing the basin into various 
coordinated development zones to achieve preset effluents load standards and least -cost abatement; (2) conducting an 
emissions permits trading system will provide environmental compensation for the upstream firms and realize Pareto 
improvement for all firms in the basin region. 
 
 
Keywords: river basin; shared improvement; local governments; coordinated mechanism 
1ˊIntroduction 
Water basin is a region delimited by divide lines and a complete, independent, and self-systemic 
hydrological unit from the source to the estuary. It is a highly integrated region whose natural factors are 
closely interrelated, particu larly between its upstream and down-stream areas. However, this natural 
integration is sectioned into various administrative areas, which leads to interests conflicts between and 
among the local governments. This status quo necessitates a coordinated mechanism for the local 
governments to execute a shared environmental protection policy  across the whole river basin, in a bid  to 
realize a win-win scenario of ambient management, economic growth, and shared prosperity. 
Under The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution , the 
State Council shall set the water quality control standards between provincial boundaries and Provincial 
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Governments shall set those standards between boundaries at lower admin istrative areas. These standards 
are important means for measuring water quality controlling performance by local governments and 
provide a technical basis for environmental compensation mechanism across the river basin. 
The goal of jo int river basin management involves both economic growth and diminishing water 
pollution loads. The empirical studies by Dinda (2004) reveal that the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(EKC) hypothesis is applicable to many countries and regions. A basic policy implicat ion from the EKC 
is that economic growth does not necessarily result in environmental deterioration, and local governments 
can actually harvest both an incremental GDP growth and a decremental pollut ion loads reduction. For the 
local governments in the Peal River Delta and Yangtze River Delta basins, considering their present 
“uphill” position on the Kuznets Curve, it is significantly imperative for them to set up a coordinated 
mechanism to develop into the “downhill” situation. 
According to Hung et al (2005), the trad ing-ratio system (TRS) is a cost-effective instrument to 
achieve the predetermined standards of environmental quality at minimum aggregate abatement costs. 
Their researches show that, when the trading-ratio  is equal to the inter-zonal effluents transfer coefficients, 
dischargers can trade with each other freely to reduce their t ransaction costs. They also maintain that, 
given cost-min imization and no transaction costs, dischargers can achieve the goal of cost -effectiveness 
through simultaneous trading and sequential bilateral trading. Sun et al (2008) improved Hung’s model by 
incorporating a socially-funded water pollutants treatment facility and got the conclusion that zonal 
discharge loads can be reduced under limited  total permits trading. Sun et  al also he ld that socially- or 
privately-funded pollutants treatment facilit ies can dampen emission permits trading and accordingly 
reduce the total emissions in a region. 
However, the ro le by the government in river basin environmental protection is absent from bot h The 
TRS model by Hung et al and the improved TRS model by Sun et al. Given the roles by the local 
governments as both environmental investors and regulatory conductors, it is almost impossible in China 
to achieve environmental quality target without the involvement and facilitation by the governments. The 
failed efforts in  comprehensive water environment management in such basins as Haihe, Liaohe, and 
Taihu are the most convincing evidential cases. This paper, based on Hung et al’s TRS model, 
incorporates the role-by-government into the model as the most important factor and constructs an 
improved model for river basin environmental governance. 
2. Model construction 
2.1 model assumptions 
Considering the dominant role by the government in  environmental improvement and the precondition 
that interface monitoring technologies are in  store, we here introduce three institutional variables: (1) 
Basin aggregate emissions are limited, i.e ., total annual emissions in all the administrative zones in  the 
basin shall be below the limit; (2) Monthly section water quality indicators are embedded into the 
performance appraisal system for all administrative zones in the basin; and local governments have to buy 
allowances from others who have saved ones if they need to emit more; (3) Local governments are 
encouraged to invest in pollutants treatment facilit ies and they can trade their ext ra permits resulting from 
their treatment efforts. 
Relying on the fact that rivers are flowing uni-d irectionally from upstream to downstream,  we can 
assume that: 
(1) Environmental authorities divide the administrative region i in the basin into a number of zones. 
The most upstream zone is indexed by 1 and the most downstream zone is indexed by n;  
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(2) Upper level government has set the aggregate emission amounts E  and the total load standards of 
effluents 
0
ie
 for each administrative region in the basin; 
(3) One permit represents one unit of emissions and bears no transaction costs from trading. Emissions 
allowances can be converted into permits. A discharger who emits less than the allowances can sell its 
saved permits, which is intended to bring out abatement efforts;  
(4) The marginal abatement cost from upstream to downstream is incremental with increasing amounts 
of effluents; 
(5) Considering the self-purification function of water, the effluents transfer coefficient from upstream 
zone 
j
 to downstream zone i  )1(  ij  is 1, %jiji tt ; 
(6) Local government’s fiscal revenues S  and the amounts of effluents ie in the zone are monotone 
increasing functions, that is, 
0 
i
i
ew
wS
. 
2.2 model construction 
Under TRS model, the total abatement cost for zone i  is as follows: 
)( 10 ijjiiiiii deteeppdc  
, 
1 ij
                         (1) 
where 
0
ie
 = basin interface pollutants load standards for zone i ; 
ie
 = effluents amounts for zone i ; 
1
je
 = actual effluents amounts from zone j  into zone i ’s interface; 
id
 = pollution treatment capacity for zone i ; 
ip
 = pollution treatment prices set by the facilities in zone i ; 
p
 = market price for effluents permits. 
When
010  ijjiii detee 
, i.e., 
10
jjiiii etede   
, the emissions amounts in zone i  are 
less than the interface standards and extra permits can be auctioned with a quota of ijjiii
detee  10
. 
When
010 %ijjiii detee 
, the emissions amounts in zone j  are more than the interface standards 
and have to purchase additional permits with a quota of ijjiii
detee  10
. 
The central government, as the national environmental regulator for the whole river basin, has two 
overriding objectives: (1) seeking the least-cost abatement; and (2) keeping the aggregate effluents in 
zone i  less than the predetermined interface pollutants load standards 
0
ie
. The aggregate abatement cost 
in the whole river basin is the summing up of the abatement cost paid by n zones, so there is a trade-off 
between all the sellers and all the buyers in the permits trading transactions. Therefore, the aggregate 
abatement cost for n zones is  
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The central government’s objectives can be expressed as  
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When the effluents from upstream to downstream are on the increase, the marginal abatement costs 
and prices are incremental, that is, ndddd %% 321 , and at the same time 
npppp %%%% 321
. For the central government to achieve its least-cost objective in Equation 
(3), the optimal strategy is 1ppn   approximat ing zero, or put differently, the less emission by the 
upstream zones the better. Likewise, Equation (4) tells us that there exist effluents transfer from upstream 
zones to downstream zones, or put differently, the more effluents by the upstream zones, the bigger 
impact on the downstream zones. When we combine and examine Equations (3) and (4), we find out that 
the central government’s best policy is to locate the high -pollution firms in the downstream basin and the 
low-pollution or pollution-free firms in the upstream basin.  
From the above discussion, we can obtain two conclusions: 
Theorem 1   The central government, in order to achieve its objectives in Equations (3) and (4), needs 
to design its pollution abatement policies from an overall river basin perspective, that is, locate the firms 
according to their core business. The upstream firms shall be classified as restricted -development or no-
development firms while the downstream firms as  optimized-development or key-development ones. 
Local governments have to be viewed as “economic men” and they have the motivation to seek profit 
maximization. Their profits come from fiscal revenues and permits selling income (when the emissions 
are below the set goal ) and their expenditures go to pollution treatment costs and payment for emissions 
permits (when the emissions are above the set goal). 
Assuming that there are two adjacent local governments i  and 1i , located upstream and 
downstream respectively. The downstream government has higher productivity than the upstream one, i.e., 
i
ii
eei w
w
w
w  SS  
1
1
. Considering the fact that the local government’s fiscal revenues S  and the 
predetermined effluents amount ie  are both monotone incremental functions, the only way to achieve 
profit maximization  is to meet the preset interface effluents load standards when there is no permits 
trading mechanism. 
The benefits for the local governments can be expressed as follows: 
iiiiiii pdetew   )( 0 1)1(0S
                                        (5) 
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0
)1(
0
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                                 (6) 
where 
0
1ie
, 
0
ie
, and 
0
1ie
 are all preset interface load standards.  
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When there is a permits trading mechanism, local government i  is willing to sell permits ie'  to local 
government 1i  upon the condition that the latter has achieved more profits, that is, it needs to satisfy 
the following: > @ 0)()( 0 1)1(00 1)1(0 t''  iiiiiiiiiiiiii pdeteeppdeete SS
 
which can be rewritten as  
)()( 0 1)1(00 1)1(0 iiiiiiiiii eeteeteep 't'  SS
                           (7) 
And the local government 1i  also has to satisfy the following: > @ > @ 0)()( 110)1(0 1110)1(0 1 t'''  iiiiiiiiiiiiiii pdeteeppdeetee SS
    
which can be rewritten as  > @ iiiiiiiiiii epeteeetee 't''  )()( 0)1(0 10)1(0 1 SS
                 (8) 
Combine Equations (7) and (8), we can obtain > @ )()()()( 0 1)1(00 1)1(00)1(0 10)1(0 1 iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii eeteeteepeteeetee 't't''  SSSS
(9) 
From Equation (9), we can see that local governments in the river basin can get Pareto improvement 
between and among themselves through the permits trading system without compromising each other’s 
economic benefits.  
Equation (9) is tenable in that i
ii
eei w
w
w
w  SS  
1
1
 and there also exists a set of Pareto optimal solutions 
to satisfy the conditions.  
From the above discussions, we can have the second conclusion. 
Theorem 2    When downstream governments with higher productivity sell their emission permits to 
the upstream governments with lower productivity, all local governments in the  basin can achieve Pareto 
improvement through the emissions trading system while providing environmental compensation to the 
upstream governments. 
3. Conclusions  
With a coordinated management mechanism between and among the local governments in the river 
basin, a trans-zonal water quality monitoring and supervisory framework, and a permits trading system, 
we can gain the overall water quality improvement and reduce overall effluents. The trading system can 
provide environmental compensation between upstream governments and downstream governments and 
realize Pareto improvement in the entire river basin, ending up in an all -win scenario. The central 
government can optimize the development environment for the river basin by div iding the firms  into 
various development categories, as mentioned above. 
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